

# A More Effective Approach for Preventing Wildland-Urban Fire Disasters (2019)

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## Summary

Communities exposed to inevitable extreme wildfire conditions do not have to incur inevitable disastrous fire destruction. Research shows that the characteristics of a home and its immediate surroundings within 100 feet (30 meters) principally determine home ignitions. This area, called the *home ignition zone* (HIZ), defines wildland-urban (WU) fires as a home ignition problem and not a problem of controlling wildfires. Communities can readily reduce home ignitability within the HIZ to prevent WU fire disasters instead of increasing wildfire suppression that fails during extreme wildfire conditions. Reducing the ignition conditions within the HIZ to produce ignition resistant homes provides an effective alternative for preventing WU fire disasters without necessarily controlling extreme wildfires.

## Inevitable Wildfires and Extreme Burning Conditions

Wildfire occurrence is inevitable and thus, a small percentage of wildfires will inevitably attain uncontrollable extreme wildfire conditions. For over one-hundred years U.S. fire suppression has successfully controlled 95 to 98 percent of wildfires with initial attack (Stephens and Ruth 2005). However, there is no historical evidence or current fire management trend to suggest that all wildfires can be excluded and if not excluded, controlled with an initial suppression response. Thus, we can assume the inevitability of wildfires and the occurrence of extreme wildfire conditions (Williams 2013). Most wildfires controlled at initial attack occur during moderate to high conditions. During severe conditions of drought, high winds, low relative humidity and multiple ignitions, 2 – 5 percent of the wildfires producing rapid growth with high burning intensities escape initial attack suppression.

The primary Federal, state and local approach for protecting structures from wildfires and preventing community fire disasters is wildfire control using suppression added by pre-suppression fuel breaks and shrub and forest fuel treatments (Finney and Cohen 2003; Cohen 2010). However, disastrous community wildfire destruction (greater than 100 homes destroyed) has only occurred during extreme wildfire conditions when high wind speeds, low relative humidity and continuous flammable vegetation result in rapid fire growth rates and numerous spot ignitions from showers of burning embers (firebrands); that is, the conditions when wildfire control fails (Cohen 2010; Calkin et al. 2014).

Community fire destruction during wildfires will continue as long as wildfire suppression continues to be the primary residential protection approach. The inevitability of uncontrolled extreme wildfires suggests inevitable disastrous home destruction; however, research on how homes ignite during extreme wildfires indicates practical opportunities for effectively creating ignition resistant homes and thereby preventing community fire disasters without necessarily controlling wildfires (Cohen 2000a; Cohen 2001; Cohen 2004; Cohen and Stratton 2008; Cohen 2010; Calkin et al. 2014; Cohen 2017). We can immediately see how homes were not ignited during a wildfire from the readily observable patterns of destruction.



Paradise, CA; 2018 Camp Fire  
Figure 1.

Southwest CO; 2002 Missionary Ridge Fire

S Cal; 2007 Grass Valley Fire

## Patterns of Home Destruction during Wildfires

Total home destruction surrounded by green tree canopies following the Camp Fire in Paradise, CA (Figure 1, left photo) has been reported as unusual; however, unconsumed vegetation adjacent to and surrounding total home destruction is the typical WU fire pattern associated with extreme wildfire conditions (Cohen 2000b; Cohen and Stratton 2003a; Cohen 2003b; Cohen and Stratton 2008; Graham et al. 2012; Cohen 2017). The center photo (Figure 1) shows an example of a burning home that could have only ignited from lofted burning embers (firebrands) on the home and low intensity surface fire spreading to contact the home. The three photos (Figure 1) of home destruction with adjacent unconsumed shrub and tree vegetation indicate the following:

- ***High intensity wildfire did not continuously spread through the residential area as a wave or flood of flame.***
- ***Unconsumed shrub and tree canopies adjacent to homes did not produce high intensity flames that ignited the homes; ignitions could only be from firebrands and low intensity surface fires.***
- ***The ‘big flames’ of high intensity wildfires did not cause total home destruction.***

High intensity wildfires do not spread through residential areas such as Paradise. The continuous tree and shrub canopies required to maintain high intensity wildfire spread (crown fires) are broken by fuel gaps such as streets, driveways and home sites (Cohen 2010). Figure 2 shows how a crown fire spread to but could not continue beyond the first residential street. Although the crown fire terminated at the street, firebrands showered downwind into the residential area initiating fires resulting in several blocks of total home destruction (Cohen 2010). Extreme wildfire conditions initiate ignitions within residential areas but the residential fuels, structures and vegetation continue the residential burning resulting in total home destruction. Commonly, homes ignite and burn hours after the wildfire has ceased active burning near the community (Cohen and Stratton 2008; Cohen 2010).



Figure 2.

Furthermore, the typical WU fire patterns indicate that conditions local to a home principally determine home ignitions with firebrands the principal source of ignitions within the residential area. The totally destroyed home in Figure 3 indicates firebrands as the only possible ignition source, potentially igniting the home directly and the flammable materials adjacent to the home. Firebrands are a given during extreme WU fire conditions; however, regardless of the distance firebrands were lofted, firebrand ignitions depend on the local conditions of the ignitable surfaces on or adjacent to a home.



Figure 3.

### **An Effective Approach for Preventing WU Fire Disasters**

Research (Cohen 2004) has quantified “local ignition conditions” to be an area of a home and its immediate surroundings within 100 feet (30 meters). This area is called the ***home ignition zone (HIZ)*** (Cohen 2010; NFPA 2018). The relatively small area of the HIZ principally determines home ignitions during extreme wildfires and defines WU fire destruction as a home ignition problem that can be prevented by readily addressing home ignition vulnerabilities within the HIZ without necessarily controlling wildfires. For example, an ignition resistant home does not have a flammable wood roof, flammable tree debris on the roof, in the rain gutters, on decks and adjacent ground within 5 feet (1.5 m) of flammable siding, firewood within 30 feet (9 m), or unscreened vents. Clearing the HIZ of vegetation is not necessary. As indicated by the typical patterns of WU fire destruction, shrub and tree canopies are not spreading high intensity fires through communities. The inevitability of uncontrolled extreme wildfires spreading to communities does not mean WU fire disasters are inevitable if we address the problem with the readily available approach of reducing home ignitability. For more

information on creating ignition resistant homes visit [www.firewise.org](http://www.firewise.org) (NFPA 2018). Ignition resistant communities increase community fire protection effectiveness, life-safety options for residents and firefighters, and decrease wildfire suppression costs while preventing WU fire disasters without attempting to protect communities by controlling wildfires.

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